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J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman. Broken Promises: A History of
Conscription in Canada. Revised edition. Oakville, ON: Rock’s Mills
Press, 2015. Pp. 282.
J.L. Granatstein, one of the most prolific Canadian military historians,
writes in Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada,
“[n]o single issue has divided Canadians so sharply as conscription
for overseas military service in time of war” (p. v). The explosive
nature of this question, along with the quality of the original book,
now reissued in a revised form, may explain why historians have
mostly stayed at arm’s length from this still sensitive political and
cultural topic. For this, Rock’s Mills Press’ effort to release a new
edition of this critical work—first published by Oxford University
Press (Canada)—is to be applauded.
Rather than an overview of the history of conscription from the
early days of New France up until today, the reader is quickly plunged
into a more particular study of the politics of conscription for overseas
service in both World Wars. Using government records and private
papers of key politicians, Granatstein and the late J.M. Hitsman
examine conscription through the lens of political history rather
than a strictly military-oriented analysis. They seek to explain the
reasons leading to the decision to adopt conscription and measure the
domestic damage of such a resolution on Canadian unity, especially
given promises made by Prime Ministers Robert Laird Borden and
William Lyon Mackenzie King prior to the World Wars that there
would be no conscription for service overseas. As is well known, these
promises were made primarily to the considerable French-Canadian
minority. However, other men and families were keenly interested
as well: many farmers, non-British immigrants, and other men of
military age were also less than enthusiastic about compulsory service
in overseas wars. The authors then turn their attention to Canada’s
top two political leaders, exploring the deepening pressures that led
them to reverse course and approve conscription for military service
overseas, thus breaking key electoral promises and threatening social
harmony at home during the World Wars. In both conflicts, it was
the logic of death and heavy casualties, along with slow voluntary
recruitment, that created important shortages in Canadian infantry
battalions. The English-speaking majority thought that conscription
was necessary to keep fighting units at full strength. Yet it was
also a matter of showing patriotism towards the Imperial “Mother
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Country,” as well as a way to compel the “disloyal” and “cowardly”
French Canadians (and others) to share in the highest burden of
war. Conscription therefore not only sharply divided French and
English Canadians but also jeopardised the stability of the federal
government. In return, it had minimal military results since the
number of conscripts who reached the front in both wars formed
only a small portion of the Canadian forces. Hence, Granatstein and
Hitsman conclude correctly that the considerable long-term damage
done to Canadian political life was not worth the price of compulsory
service.
Shortage of infantry reinforcements in both wars were partly
the result of heavy casualties as well as creeping and low voluntary
enlistments over several years, but other factors were involved. In
the Great War, much of the blame for the conscription crisis should
be put on the politicians. In 1917, shortages additionally resulted
from the pledge of Prime Minister Borden the prior year to raise
the authorised strength of the Canadian army to 500,000 men. He
did so intent on an Imperial and Allied commitment in the period of
heaviest fighting, yet without any idea whether Canada—a country
with a population of only 7.2 million—had enough manpower to
sustain such an organisation. Political interference, the disorganised
voluntary recruiting system established at the outbreak of war by
Minister of Militia and Defence, Sir Sam Hughes, and comparably
inefficient military organisation in Britain, all this did not help. The
fact that Borden also sought to exploit the issue for political advantage
in the election of 1917 was disastrous. It would have lasting effects on
Canadian political life in the next decades.
In the Second World War, the leading politicians showed they
had learned some lessons from the First, shifting onto the military
the weight of responsibility for the manpower shortages that became
critical in 1944, the great killing year for Western armies only then
breaching Hitler’s Festung Europa. The Canadian Army—with a
total force of almost half a million soldiers at the end of 1944—was
not able to produce the 15,000 trained reinforcements necessary to
keep its infantry units at full strength. This was partly the result of
operating in two widely separated theatres, an extensive organisation
in Britain, and a huge training establishment in Canada. It was
also the consequence of the decision made by Prime Minister
Mackenzie King to authorise a greatly enlarged army in 1942, even
though Canada had already committed to a considerable air force, a
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significant navy, and an extensive industrial and agricultural effort.
He did so on the advice of the generals that large field forces could
be kept at full strength through the voluntary recruiting system.
The generals were proven wrong once casualties rose with constant
battle contact with Axis forces. Forced to break his conscription
promise in November 1944, Mackenzie King was nevertheless able
to keep the country and his government united. This was due to his
great political ability and the fact that he really tried to observe his
promises to French Canada.
Granatstein’s and Hitsman’s original work was a well-written
and thoroughly researched account, raising expectations for this new
edition. Unfortunately, the revisions amount to no more than a new
three-page-long introduction by Granatstein explaining why he does
not agree with his original conclusions. In the past three decades, he
turns his attention to the deleterious impact of manpower shortages on
infantry units in the theatres of active operations. Failure of Canadian
units to reach set objectives and greater casualties were the cold, hard
results in the fighting zones. Therefore, Granatstein now believes that
there was indeed a military necessity to adopt conscription in both
conflicts, a position he believes most Canadian readers would not
agree with. While this latest introduction is instructive about the shift
in one scholar’s views, it does not alter what we already knew about
the central issue. Indeed, Granatstein had previously worked out this
position with greater detail in other publications: one chapter in The
Generals; his article “Conscription and My Politics” in Canadian
Military History;1 his chapter “Conscription in the Great War” in
Canada and the First World War;2 and one of his latest books
the Greatest Victory.3 Consequently, there is nothing fresh, new,
or additionally important about this purported “third edition” and
readers familiar with the first and second editions are thus advised to
keep their loonies in their pockets.
Furthermore, the editing of this new volume is wanting, from
unwelcome changes to the footnotes that introduce confusion, to
1  
J.L. Granatstein, “Conscription and My Politics,” Canadian Military History 10, No. 4
(Autumn 2001): 35-38.
2  
Granatstein, “Conscription in the Great War,” in Canada and the First World War:
Essays in Honour of Robert Craig Brown, David Mackenzie, ed. (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2005): 62-75.
3  
Granatstein, The Greatest Victory: Canada’s One Hundred Days, 1918 (Don Mills,
ON: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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too many misprints and errors in both French and English. This is
unfortunate. Such shortcomings interfere with the quality and mask
the importance of the original work, on which serious researchers and
readers should instead continue to rely.
caroline d ’ amours , royal canadian military college of canada
and boston university
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